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Errol Meidinger, Chris Elliott and Gerhard Oesten (eds.)  
Social and Political Dimensions of Forest Certification, 2002 
FOREST CERTIFICATION AS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
MAKING BY GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY∗ 
Errol E. Meidinger 
Professor of Law 
State University of New York 
Buffalo, New York, USA 
“Law is that which is boldly asserted and resolutely maintained.” 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Forest certification programs are schemes methodically crafted by transnational networks of 
policy actors to define and implement the rules under which forest management enterprises 
are to operate. They undertake to verify not only that the standards under which certified 
enterprises operate are appropriate, but also that they are being met. Thus, certification 
programs take on policymaking and enforcement roles more typically performed by 
governments. A companion paper (Meidinger 2002) argues that forest certification programs 
may usefully be understood as an emerging form of governance by ‘global civil society,’ and 
seeks to describe key characteristics of global civil society and its governance structures. 
‘Governance,’ however, is generally closely related to law; law making is a typical function of 
governance systems. Moreover, the methods used by certification programs closely resemble 
law, since they rely on the public promulgation of generalized rules and the definition of 
special organizational responsibilities for determining compliance. In this paper, therefore, I 
take the next step, and argue that forest certification programs may usefully be seen as a 
form of law making by global civil society. The primary advantage of this strategy is that it 
makes available to discussions of forest certification the experience and analytical methods 
of legal and socio-legal analysis. This should enrich forest certification, and help its 
                                                           
∗ Comments by the participants in the Freiburg Conference, the Law Faculty Workshop at SUNY-Buffalo, and the 
Harrison Program on the Global Future at the University of Maryland are gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks 
to David Westbrook, Alex Ziegert, and Karol Soltan for their insightful critiques, and to Adam Rizzo for research 
assistance. This paper was made possible by research support from the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, 
State University of New York at Buffalo, for which the author is most grateful.  
1 This aphorism was attributed to the late United States Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis, by one of his 
former law clerks, Nathaniel L. Nathanson, as recounted to my Constitutional Law class at Northwestern 
University Law School in February of 1975.  
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proponents to scrutinize assumptions that heretofore have been taken for granted but have 
the capacity over time to seriously undermine their programs.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next two subsections offer brief descriptions of my 
methodology and perspective. The following section provides a general overview of the 
historical relationship between law and civil society. It argues that civil society has long been 
an important source of law, and that our tendency to equate law with the state is not only a 
very recent prejudice, but also one that significantly misconstrues the genesis of state law in 
the present era. The next section lays the foundation for understanding how forest 
certification may articulate with the existing environmental law system by providing brief 
historical overviews of national and international environmental law. These are based largely 
on Anglo-American law, but are sufficiently general to be suggestive for other western legal 
systems as well. The final section of the paper brings some of the experience of legal 
scholarship to bear on forest certification. It argues among other things that it would 
behoove certification programs to become more sophisticated about the challenges of 
enforcing rules effectively, the need to learn and adapt based on experience, the difficulties 
of achieving consistency across highly varied situations, and the general challenges of 
attaining legitimacy. Although this paper touches briefly on what is perhaps the greatest 
normative problem for forest certification, its relationship to democracy, that problem is left 
largely for a later paper. 
PERSPECTIVE 
Most people who become involved with emerging, politically contentious fields such as 
forest certification have an agenda. Mine is largely that of an academic researcher. I have 
long been interested in two fundamental questions of institutional sociology:  
1. How are social rules and standards made?  
2. How are they institutionalized in social behavior?  
I find the field of forest certification movement to be a fascinating and potentially important 
arena for studying these questions because it may be one of the leading edges of emerging 
institutions for making and enforcing rules on a global scale.  
At the same time, my interest as a researcher is not merely academic. One of my goals 
is to help understand how to build social institutions that promote environmental 
stewardship and social justice. This paper and its companion attempt to do so by clarifying 
some of the relationships between forest certification and global civil society, and by 
bringing some of the experience with governmental regulatory and legal institutions into the 
forest certification debate, which thus far has tended to be limited to foresters and 
environmentalists who think all they are doing is trying to promote sustainable forest 
management.  
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METHOD 
Like its companion, this paper is best seen as an exercise in imaginative social theory. It takes 
two general, contested, and ‘under construction’ concepts - global civil society and 
environmental law and - and seeks to situate forest certification in terms of them. It subjects 
the hypothesis that forest certification is an emergent form of environmental law (initially 
developed in Meidinger 1999 and 2001a), to a mutual-illumination strategy, using 
environmental and other legal scholarship to examine forest certification and also using 
forest certification scholarship to reflect back on law. The overall goal is to paint a picture in 
which we can view forest certification in the context of larger institutional developments, 
both indicating where environmental law may be headed and how forest certification may 
have to adapt to meet the challenges of global environmental law.  
This methodological strategy is subject to important limitations. Most importantly, it 
entails a significant degree of arbitrariness. Another scholar following a similar method could 
focus on different factors within the field of study and perhaps reach quite different 
conclusions. This limitation is mitigated considerably, however, by the fact that this paper 
will be part of a larger discussion of forest certification, global governance, and 
environmental law. It is likely to be complemented and challenged by other works, and its 
arguments will be grist for their mill. 
LAW AND CIVIL SOCIETY  
DOMESTIC 
The relationship of law to civil society has usually been either ambiguous or contested. The 
Greeks and Romans took the rule of law to be essential to civil society, but had a multitude 
of theories about the source of law. During the feudal period, the guilds and other urban 
corporate bodies that gave rise to civil society played a large role in making and enforcing 
rules. As the nation states solidified their authority and created separate forums for 
authoritative law making, they generally endorsed and adopted guild and community made 
rules, but also gradually revised them to provide interregional consistency, pursue their own 
goals, and accommodate new conditions (Poggi 1978:78-79). Concurrently, the nation states 
asserted a monopoly on the authority to make binding laws. Legal theorists assisted that 
effort by developing a supporting rationale, systematizing law at the level of the nation state 
(particularly in civil law countries) and establishing elite ‘national’ law schools.  
Since the late 18th century, the assumption that law necessarily emanates from a 
sovereign state has become deeply embedded in both Civil and Anglo-American legal 
thought. Accordingly, it is not surprising that modern commentators often take as given that 
the law of civil society is made by nation states, and that nation states must be urged by civil 
society actors - petitioned by them - to make laws supporting civil society in the first place 
and to implement civil society agendas in the second (e.g., Mertus 1999:1338-1339; Etzioni 
2000:356-357).  
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In practice, however, the situation has always been more complex. Continental legal 
scholars, such as Ehrlich (1913) and Heller (1996, orig. 1933), pointed out that law must take 
on meaning from the context in which it is implemented; people give meaning to legal terms 
by the inevitably variable ways in which they live and organize themselves to implement 
them. Heller explained this difficult argument as follows: “The very same general court 
structure proclaimed by Josef II would lead in Austria to a written and mediated court 
procedure, but in the Netherlands to an oral and immediate one” (1996:1191). Thus, civil 
society necessarily has a role in ‘making’ law, even when the official source of law is the state. 
Weber (1922) took the argument a major step further by arguing that law means little unless 
it is accorded legitimacy by society, and that it must therefore be made with the goal of 
legitimacy in mind. Thus again, actors outside the state necessarily shape the law given to 
them by the state because the state must tailor it to gain their acquiescence.  
Although Anglo American systems never adopted the positivist view as completely as 
the civil law systems, their courts, legislatures and administrative agencies came over time to 
be seen as the exclusive sources of law. The American legal realists of the 1920s-1950s, 
however, countered by arguing that much law was in fact made outside government bodies. 
For example, a contract between employer and employee was legally binding and enforceable 
by government agencies without significant government input as to its terms. The parties 
therefore could be seen as defining the substantive content of law, and hence as exercising 
delegated state power. Not only that, but the terms of the contract would very likely reflect 
pre-existing social or economic relationships in society (Hale 1920). Thus in reality, the 
authors of the law would not be the individual contractors so much as the system of social 
relationships in which they operated - in effect civil society in many cases.  
Karl Llewellyn and others extended this insight by arguing that judges and legislators 
should adjudicate and legislate based on empirical information on the social practices to 
which the law applies. A commercial code, for example, should be based on the practice and 
context of real-world commercial transactions, rather than on abstract principles. The same 
would be true of laws governing non profit organizations such as unions, religious 
organizations, and so on - thus allowing civil society to “author” general rules of law. In 
addition, particular legal documents should be interpreted in terms of the “usage in trade” 
providing the context for the transaction to which they apply, which the parties could be 
presumed to have presupposed in their bargaining (Llewellyn 1960). In sum, continental and 
Anglo-American legal scholars laid strong conceptual foundations for a revitalized 
understanding of civil society’s role of in law making during the first half of the 20th century.  
One might expect that the rapid growth of the empirical social sciences in the second 
half of the 20th century would stimulate much further progress in clarifying the relationship 
between civil society and law. That does not seem to have been the case, however. Although 
the reasons go well beyond the scope of this paper, two are relevant to this analysis. First, 
most members of what came to be called the “law and society movement” have been 
unwilling to focus on defining which social phenomena count as law and which do not. This 
posture seems to reflect a sense that pursuing such a question is likely to lead into an infinite 
regress of formalist jurisprudential arguments that simply recapitulate their premises. 
Moreover, many law and society scholars seem to have assumed that what counts as law is 
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an empirical question, although this assumption is conceptually problematic and accepted 
methods for addressing it have never been developed.  
Second, law and society researchers have typically drawn upon established social 
science disciplines and sought to explain legal phenomena in terms of variables central to 
those disciplines. To a great extent this has meant viewing the work of courts, administrative 
agencies, and legislatures as products of economic interests, political power, social class, 
cognitive assumptions, and the like. Efforts to bring these variables together in a “legal 
system” conception might well have included a component with civil society as a law-maker, 
but by and large they have not (e.g., Friedman 1978, Chaps. 1, 6). Law and society scholars 
nudged toward that possibility by developing the concepts of formal and informal legal 
systems (e.g., Schwartz ,1954) and law-in-the-books versus law-in-action (e.g., Abel 1973). 
But they pulled back from the potential implications of these ideas with regard to modern 
societies. On one hand, informal law making was seen largely as a phenomenon of 
“traditional” rather than “modern” societies, and often as a matter of “normative,” rather 
than truly legal ordering. Thus it is not surprising that today a separate “law and norms” 
movement has emerged, which blithely assumes that norms are distinct from law, and then 
expresses collective amazement at the importance of norms in ordering social life (e.g., 
Posner 2000).  
Law-in-action studies, on the other hand, have concentrated almost entirely on the way 
law is made and applied by governmental bodies. Thus, law and society scholars have 
focused on the outputs of national and local governments, judges and legislators. Whether 
the research is on disputing, the legal profession, legal agencies, or even legal theory, most 
research seen as central to the field (see, for example, the studies cited in Munger 1997) has 
as its endpoint and taken-for-granted analytical filter government legal institutions, thus 
neglecting the potential law making operations of civil society institutions.  
Still, there exist several strands of socio-legal research that have focused to some extent 
on civil society relationships. Perhaps the best known is research on how people understand 
and incorporate (or ignore) law in their everyday lives (e.g., Greenhouse, et al. 1994, Sarat 
and Kearns 1993). For the most part, however, work in this tradition has not critiqued the 
assumption that law is made up of the rules and acts of the governmental agencies. Rather, it 
has focused on the distance between government and civil society, and the nature of 
interactions between them.  
A second school of thought has explicitly rejected the assumption that law is 
necessarily associated with government agencies, and sought instead to bring into the ambit 
of law the full set of social institutions that define and enforce social rights and duties. In his 
study of industrial relations, for example, Philip Selznick (1969), built on the post-realist 
work of Lon Fuller (1964) and H.L.A. Hart (1964) to describe important law making 
processes in non-governmental organizations such as arbitration associations and 
universities. While widely admired, however, this and related work (e.g., Galanter 1981) 
seems to have had little effective impact on the state-centric understanding of law held by 
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most empirical researchers, legal scholars and practitioners.2 The same seems to be true of 
“legal system” approaches developed in the past few decades by German theorists such as 
Luhmann (1985) and Teubner (1997a and b). Although they have sought to locate the 
essence of law in the capacity of social institutions to declare certain types of acts acceptable 
or unacceptable, their impacts on scholarship and practice to date appear to be very limited.3 
It is possible, however, that the currently marginal schools of thought represented by 
Selznick and Luhmann will receive a strong push toward the center of legal scholarship by 
the recent and rapid development of global law making institutions that are not reducible to 
government agencies.  
GLOBAL 
With the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the global legal arena officially became the “inter-
national” legal arena - meaning that it was constituted solely by, for, and of nation states. 
Enacting a vision worked out by Hugo Grotius (1625) and others in the preceding decades, 
the nation states constituted themselves as independent, equal, and exclusive legal actors in 
the international arena. Each was free to make laws governing its citizens, lands, and other 
assets. Any law applicable across or beyond the jurisdictions of nation states had to be made 
by the nation states affected, either by treaty or by some other mutually recognized process. 
Any law imposing an obligation on a state had to rest on a formal expression of consent by 
that state (Falk 1997:337).  
The Westphalian legal system has long been under pressure for reasons too numerous 
to discuss here. The factors driving globalization described in the companion paper 
(Meidigner 2002) are among the most important. International trade in particular has created 
huge challenges for state-based conceptions of law. The drive to simplify and promote trade 
has been an important factor in the rise of the European community and its establishment of 
institutions that are not explicable merely as agreements among states (e.g., Joerges 2001).  
International trade also has driven the growth of legal institutions more self-
consciously distinct from states. Since an interstate transaction crosses jurisdictions, it could 
conceivably be governed by the law of either jurisdiction, and international traders have gone 
to enormous lengths to attempt to choose the law applicable to their transactions. In general, 
each trader is likely to have an aversion to submitting to the legal system of the other trader. 
It did not take traders long to realize that there might be advantages in being governed by 
law from still other jurisdictions, or even in making their own law and using arbitrators to 
enforce it, and they took steps to do both. Gradually a distinctive set of rules and institutions 
for dealing with transnational commercial transactions has arisen - lex mercatoria, the “law 
merchant.”  
                                                           
2 Ironically, one of the major studies of non-governmental regulation, Cheit 1990, originally done as a Berkeley 
doctoral dissertation, does not explicitly build on Selznick’s insights.  
3 For an early effort to apply the perspective of Luhmann and Teubner to forest certification, see Lawson and 
Cashore (n.d.) For a particularly clear and careful exposition of Luhmannian legal theory, see Ziegert 
(forthcoming). 
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Although a tremendous amount of ink has been spilled debating the status and content 
of lex mercatoria, the present discussion can be limited to two basic points. First, a large 
number of problems regarding international commercial transactions are in fact settled 
through the lex mercatoria system (e.g., Dezalay and Garth 1996). Second, the system is not 
reducible to the law of states or to laws made by combinations of states. This is so even 
though many state legal systems are committed by treaty to enforce the judgments of non-
state lex mercatoria arbitration panels.4 The obvious next question is whether lex mercatoria 
should be treated as law or as something else. This is a question which I may yet write about 
in detail, but not here. For now it suffices to say that the benefits of holding off with 
thinking about phenomena such as lex mercatoria as law until all of the traditional elements 
(e.g., a widely recognized coercive mechanism) are clearly present are far outweighed by the 
costs. To hold back, or to argue about definitions, is to forego the opportunity to carry out 
research and analysis on non-governmental law making while it is happening, a high cost 
indeed. Moreover, it is to deprive civil society institution building processes such as forest 
certification of the full experience and scrutiny of legal and socio-legal research, a problem 
regardless of whether one is a supporter or a critic (Spiro 1996). For now, therefore, I think 
it appropriate to treat Teubner’s bold statement as probably accurate and work form that 
basis. 
[G]lobalization of law creates a multitude of decentered law-making processes in 
various sectors of civil society, independently of nation-states. Technical 
standardization, professional rule production, human rights, intra-organizational 
regulation in multinational enterprises, contracting, arbitration and other institutions of 
lex mercatoria are forms of rule making by ‘private governments’ which have appeared 
on a massive global scale. They claim worldwide validity independently of the law of 
nation-states and in relative distance to the rules of international public law. They have 
come into existence not by formal acts of nation-states but by strange paradoxical acts 
of self-validation (1997b:xii). 
BASIC CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES 
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to note that there seem to be two basic approaches to 
the decision to treat lex mercatoria and other forms of non-governmental regulation as law, 
which can be characterized loosely as internal and external. Internal perspectives focus on 
the nature of the system that produces the phenomenon at issue. There are several main 
variants. One focuses on the institutions involved in the system. The traditional legal 
positivist perspective, for example, generally requires that for law to exist an agency of a 
nation state must formulate an order that it is prepared to enforce with coercion (Austin 
1832). The focus on the nation state is limited to a particular historical period, however, and 
                                                           
4 Under the New York Convention of 1958 over 120 countries have committed to enforce arbitral awards where 
such awards are based on written contracts to subject commercial disputes to arbitration and to abide by the 
decisions (McConnaughay 2001:611). 
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there is no good reason to presume that law did not exist prior to the nation state. Thus, 
there is no inherent reason the list of relevant institutional sources cannot be enlarged. One 
could conceivably include some or many of the “civil society” organizations described above 
in the legal system.  
A second variant of the internalist perspective focuses on characteristic functioning and 
products of the system. This is the strategy of Luhmann (1985; Ziegert forthcoming) and 
Teubner (1997b:14), which focuses on social communication processes that produce “binary 
coding” - e.g, legal/illegal. Since the judgment could as well be sustainable/unsustainable, it 
seems plausible to treat forest certification as a form of law making. The only limitation in 
principle is the occasional timidity of the certification systems in holding back from using 
strong and definite labels.  
The externalist approach to defining law looks at how it is received and used in the 
larger society. This is the approach suggested by Weber’s concept of legitimacy. Falk and 
Strauss build upon it by emphasizing a public expectation that people will conform to a rule, 
and the “pull toward compliance” exerted by the rule (2000:207, following Franck 1990). It 
is the force of public justice referred to by Professors Mohawk and Lyons in the mid-1980s 
discussion described in the companion paper. Legitimacy is a difficult criterion to apply in 
practice, since different people could disagree on whether such an expectation of and pull 
toward compliance exist in a particular cases, but it refers to a very important aspect of law 
which it would be hard to justify ignoring, as is discussed further in the concluding section of 
this paper.  
A second externalist strategy is to look at how society uses organizations in a given 
social field to make and enforce rules. This is the method used by Dezalay and Garth (1995 
and 1996) in their study of the growth of an arbitration system for resolving transnational 
commercial disputes.5 Their distinctive contribution is to describe in detail how transnational 
enterprises use dispute resolution services and how potential arbitrators and arbitration 
alliances build institutions to compete for business in the field. In the course of that 
competition they shape the overall transnational commercial arbitration system in ways that 
suit their interests and those of the commercial transactions system. It seems likely that a 
similar approach could be used to describe the field of forest certification, wherein programs 
compete for influence and legitimacy, and in the course of that competition shape the overall 
law and policy of forest certification.6  
In sum, if one takes the criteria discussed above - institutional rule-making and 
adjudication mechanisms, public legitimacy, and social usage - there is a good, although not 
incontrovertible case for treating forest certification as a form of law making, specifically of 
environmental law making. The next question is what this choice gains us. Before addressing 
it a brief overview of environmental law will be helpful.  
                                                           
5 Examples of other scholars following this general approach include Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), Spiro (1996), 
Wapner (1996). 
6 The key here is that the competition is not limited to a competition for business, but is also a competition to 
establish a legal order that will support that business. At the same time, contrary to the way many economists and 
some institutionalists conceive law, the legal order is not really fixed, but rather dynamic and subject to constant 
competition (Dezalay and Garth 1996:16).  
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
DOMESTIC 
If forest certification is a kind of law making, it is probably a kind of environmental law 
making. To see how it fits and potentially changes the structure of environmental law, it is 
necessary to have a working overview of the field. Although I cannot possibly survey 
environmental law around the globe, this section begins by providing an overview of 
environmental law development in the Anglo-American system.  
Environmental law can be generally defined as the law governing the relationships of 
humans to the biophysical environment.7 As with law in general, environmental law can be 
helpfully conceptualized in terms of three basic forms or phases. At the same time, it is 
important to understand that the phases are not completely distinct, and that elements of 
each phase can be found in the others (e.g., Westbrook 1994).  
Phase 1 
Before the 19th century, most environmental law appears to have been made in civil society. 
It typically took the form of either generally accepted customs or rules developed by 
assemblies of appropriate estate holders or other interested members of society. There is 
little published research on this phase of environmental law, most likely because many 
scholars uncritically think of environmental law as a product of the 19th century, when the 
control of industrial discharges came to be widely seen as necessary. My exploratory review 
of early English legal history, however, has found a great deal of environmental regulation in 
the medieval period. Typical laws covered how many sheep and cattle could be grazed, 
where and when, how water runoff must be managed, how land fertility was to be preserved, 
and so on.  
The details of these regulations and how they were worked out are well beyond the 
scope of this paper, but it is helpful to describe a few typical institutional practices. First, 
although environmental laws usually were not voted upon nor based upon a principle of 
political equality, they were generally discussed quite thoroughly in village, town, or manorial 
assemblies. Most interested farmers and villagers probably had a ‘voice’ and would be heard 
in those assemblies. At the same time, the views of certain ‘men of substance’ (not 
necessarily free holders) generally counted most, and the resulting bylaws tended to reflect 
the interests of the better off community members (Ault 1965:42). It is also apparent that in 
most cases regulations were not simply dictated or imposed by officials. Whether or not the 
lord of the manor could in principle set the rules under which the manor and village 
operated, it is clear that he did not do so for most natural resource and environmental 
                                                           
7 There are risks to such a broad definition, primarily of taking in such a huge and unwieldy area that it resists 
meaningful conceptualization. The recent histories of the subfields, however, indicate a need to deal with 
interconnections among them. Protecting an endangered arctic species, for example, may require controlling land 
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regulations. These were more typically worked out by concerned groups of citizens and then 
sometimes ratified by the lord. Depending on the village of origin environmental laws might 
be described as ordained “by the whole homage and by the freemen” “by the whole 
township”, “by the community of the town”, “by the lord and the community of the town”, 
“by the whole homage of the town”, “by the lord and his tenants”, “by all the tenants, free 
and customary”, or “by the assent of all the homage” (Ault 1965:41).  
Over time, the rules and policies thus worked out in customary social institutions were 
gradually incorporated into definitions of property rights, primarily through real property, 
servitude,8 and nuisance doctrines. This was done first by local courts and eventually by the 
royal courts and other agents of the crown, thus mirroring the general processes for 
incorporating guild-made rules into governmental law discussed above. As the origins of the 
property based environmental regulations receded into history, they may have begun to 
appear as if they had been created and imposed by the state in the first place. At the same 
time, however, the conflicts created by rapid urbanization and industrialization in the late 
18th and throughout the 19th century created new conflicts that were difficult to handle in 
terms of received property rights. In trying to resolve them courts increasingly asked 
whether contested land uses were ‘nuisances’. Traditional nuisance doctrine typically asked 
whether a specific resource use fit or was appropriate in a given place, thus again implicitly 
ratifying received civil society arrangements. But the static and yet somewhat unpredictable 
implications of such an approach brought increasing pressures on the courts to rationalize 
and universalize their decisions. Thus courts came to define the central question as whether 
a land use was “unreasonable” under the circumstances. This question invited judges to 
determine the proper use of land in a changing society, and perhaps even to balance the 
relative costs and benefits of alternative land uses. At the same time, such questions were 
being taken up by legislative bodies, and sometimes by newly established administrative 
agencies as well, thus inaugurating institutional structures characteristic of Phase 2.  
Phase 2 
Although the “modern” era of environmental law often is portrayed as starting in the late 
1960s or early 1970s, its institutional roots go back a hundred years earlier. By the end of the 
19th century, legislatures and administrative agencies were beginning to address 
environmental issues, promulgating a miscellany of laws directed at air and water pollution, 
as well as wildlife and forest destruction, and typically assigning their enforcement to 
administrative agencies attributed with expertise in handling such problems.9 In some 
countries this was done primarily at the local or provincial level, in others at the national 
                                                                                                                                                
use in North America as well as the use of organic pesticides in the tropics. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that a 
narrower definition of the field would be fruitful in either the near or the long term. 
8 The term “servitude” is used here to include uses and constraints on property use that often are separately 
categorized as easements, covenants, and equitable servitudes in Anglo-American law.  
9 There were striking and important precedents, of course. In England, for example, a 1388 Parliamentary statute 
forbade the deposit of “Dung and Filth of the Garbage and Intrails as well as of Beasts killed, as of other 
Corruptions … in Ditches, Rivers, and other Waters”, and required anyone who had made such deposits to 
remove them or be fined. It also provided for citizen enforcement of the law. Statute of 12 Rich. II. Ch.13 (1388). 
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level.10 On the whole, these laws appear to have been relatively ineffectual for a half century 
or more, due primarily to weak scientific foundations, relentless industrialization, and 
lackadaisical enforcement reflecting preferences in most jurisdictions for economic growth 
over environmental protection (e.g., Laitos 1980). After World War II the situation slowly 
began to change, as the impacts of industrial pollution became more widespread and better 
understood (e.g., Ashby and Anderson 1981).  
By the 1970s and 1980s most industrialized countries had established extensive 
statutory and administrative systems to protect air, water, land, and biodiversity. The systems 
are so extensive, and grow so steadily, that they are extremely difficult to understand or 
conceptualize. They range across an enormous array of subjects, running from nuclear 
power to endangered species, from historic preservation to genetically modified organisms, 
and on and on (e.g., Plater 1999). They typically involve great technological and scientific 
complexity, and face enormous uncertainty. They almost always encounter unanticipated 
interconnections and problems. Finally, they often involve difficult normative choices that 
can trigger or exacerbate social conflict. In sum, they require combining sophisticated 
political processes with sophisticated scientific ones. Not surprisingly, the challenges of 
making and revising environmental law can be staggering.  
The complex of institutional methods primarily relied upon by government legal 
systems to meet these challenges in Phase 2 is often derisively and somewhat unfairly called 
“command-and-control” regulation. Because this form of environmental law has been so 
exhaustively studied and described as to be generally familiar to most readers, I will only note 
its most basic institutional characteristics here. Phase 2 regulation places enormous reliance 
in administrative agencies directed to focus their attention on particular types of problems - 
e.g., air or pollution. The agencies are leigitimated primarily by their claims to technical 
expertise, but over time have also increasingly deployed consultative methods for developing 
and implementing policies. The core regulatory mechanism of Phase 2 environmental law is 
the requirement that categories of polluters and other natural resource users keep their 
environmental impacts at levels which would result from application of the strictest feasible 
technological methods to their production processes. Thus, although they usually do not 
require the actual use of a specific technology, these requirements are typically referred to by 
names such as “best available control technology” and “best management practices”. The 
standards are generally defined by administrative agencies for specific industries through 
rulemaking and adjudication processes. They often are set with little regard to collateral 
environmental issues, such as waste production or consumption of scarce resources. Pre-
existing plants and activities generally are treated more leniently than proposed ones. Actual 
implementation of standards varies considerably among jurisdictions, both within and 
among countries. The costs and levels of protection thus also vary among both firms and 
sectors. Like any important institutional synthesis, Phase 2 has given rise to a set of 
institutional antitheses in Phase 3. 
                                                           
10 Formally, the level made little difference because local and provincial governments by this time were defined as 
creatures of the state. (Dillon 1911) 
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Phase 3 
Phase 3 consists of a number of loosely related reform initiatives, including market 
mechanisms, information disclosure requirements, flexible permitting programs, regulatory 
negotiation, ecosystem management, place-based collaborative management initiatives, 
voluntary agreements, good neighbor agreements, and environmental certification programs. 
Many grow out of critiques of Phase 2 regulation, although some go back farther. Overlaid 
on Phase 2 regulation, the overall picture constituted by these initiatives suggests that 
environmental law is in considerable flux, and may be quite hospitable to the emergence of 
civil society regulatory initiatives such as forest certification. 
Market Mechanisms effectively attach prices to environmentally damaging activities 
and allow firms to reduce the damage if doing so is cost-effective, or to pay others or pay 
taxes if the costs of reduction are higher than the payments or taxes. Market mechanisms are 
a response to the most influential critique of traditional regulation, which holds that it is 
needlessly inefficient, costing more than necessary to achieve a given level of social benefits. 
This is because control technology standards are based on feasibility for general categories of 
polluters, rather than on individually tailored cost-benefit criteria. Thus, one firm or sector 
can be required to incur significantly higher costs than another to obtain any given level 
social benefits.11 Market mechanisms seek to obtain environmental benefits where they are 
least costly, and thus to minimize the total costs to society of environmental protection.  
Although the practical role of market mechanisms remains limited, it has been 
expanding for over two decades. At the formal level, agencies have developed a number of 
programs, such as the “offsetting”, “bubbling” and acid rain trading programs in United 
States air pollution regulation. At the informal level, too, regulatory officials appear to allow 
a certain amount of “bubbling” in individual pollution permits, even when statutes and rules 
do not provide for it. Market mechanisms are regularly extended into new regulatory 
territory. The State of California, for example, recently established an “endangered species 
mitigation bank”, whereby landowners can earn “conservation credits” by taking steps to 
permanently protect endangered species on one site and can then sell their credits to 
developers seeking to carry out projects that might harm those species on other sites (Bean 
and Dwyer 2000). 
Information Disclosure Requirements also appear to be expanding steadily in 
environmental law. The basic strategy is to require firms that handle dangerous substances or 
engage in other potentially harmful activities to publicly disclose those activities. The 
                                                           
11 On the benefit side, the argument was also made that uniform standards among jurisdictions are undesirable, 
because the benefits will vary greatly depending on population density, concentration of pollution sources, natural 
conditions, and so on. (Krier and Ursin 1978)  
Two other important initiatives also respond in large part to this critique. The first is to document means-ends, or 
cause-effect relationships between regulatory strategies and environmental goals. This of course requires a 
significant expansion in the quality of scientific information and models. A second and related initiative is to 
undertake comparative risk assessment of environmental regulation, so that resources and costs will be focused 
on the most risky activities. This is a very difficult undertaking making huge demands on science. The available 
scientific information and models are flexible enough that huge disagreements persist about the comparative risks 
of various activities. 
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paradigmatic example is the United States “Community Right to Know” law, which requires 
that anyone who stores or discharges more than set amounts of any of a list of 
approximately 600 toxic chemicals to the air, land, or water must publicly disclose the types 
and amounts of chemicals involved. This must be done regardless of whether the activities 
are legal or illegal, regulated or unregulated. Since its passage in 1987, the law appears to 
have had a large effect on the discharge of hazardous chemicals, possibly reducing them by 
over one-third (e.g., Karkkainen 2001; TRI 2001).12 This kind of “transparency” strategy is 
not cost-free, but is significantly less costly than traditional regulatory standard setting. Some 
scholars view the emergence of information disclosure requirements as a major step toward 
“reflexive” environmental law designed to make actors reflect upon the consequences of 
their acts and adjust to make them socially acceptable (e.g., Orts 1995). Others find them to 
constitute a major expansion in the ability of wider communities to monitor and set 
benchmarks for the performance of corporations (e.g., Karkkainen 2001).13 State imposed 
disclosure requirements can thus be seen as valuable resources for civil society regulatory 
institutions.  
Flexible Permitting Programs allow firms to avoid specific regulatory requirements in 
return for showing that they can provide equal or greater environmental benefits by other, 
presumably less costly means. Flexible permitting programs respond to some of the same 
critiques of command-and-control regulation as market mechanisms, but give the regulatory 
agency a more direct role in the decisional processes. Examples include “Project XL” in the 
United States and the Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme (“EMAS”)14 in the European 
Union. Rather than simply creating legally protected interests that can be traded, the 
government agency creates a framework in which firm are invited to be innovative to the 
benefit of the public, subject to some sort of check and ratification by the administrative 
agency.  
The record of flexible permitting processes is unclear at this stage. In the U.S., flexible 
permitting seems to have fallen short of expectations, creating just about as many procedural 
hurdles and business costs as it eliminated (EPA 2001) and stimulating relatively little 
environmental improvement. Recently, however, the EPA has established a new, ostensibly 
improved program called Performance Track, which relies more heavily on environmental 
management systems and non-governmental environmental certification programs such as 
ISO 14001 (EPA 2001). EMAS, which also includes a substantial EMS component,15 seems 
                                                           
12 Mazurek (1999) suggests, however, that some of these effects may be artifacts of tendencies by transnational 
companies to relocate polluting activities to jurisdictions lacking comparable disclosure laws or to outsource them 
to small companies that fall beneath threshold reporting requirements.  
13 At the same time, it is important to note that modern environmental systems still face severe and possibly 
increasing information disparities. Thus while it is true that the amount of public information seems to be 
growing absolutely in most industrial societies, the amount of private information, much of it given proprietary 
protection, may be growing even more quickly.  
14 EEC Council Regulation 1836/93 (authorizing voluntary participation by industrial firms in a community eco-
management and audit scheme) 1993 O. J. (L 168) 1. The primary benefits of EMAS participation for companies 
appear to be extended time frames for regulatory compliance and reduced penalties for non-compliance.  
15 Each company participating in the EMAS program prepares an environmental management system incorporating 
several principles, including pollution prevention and source reduction. The environmental management system 
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to be viewed as more of a success in Europe, although it too has fallen short of expectations. 
Nonetheless, these programs persist and seem to be growing, as agencies work to improve 
them in successive iterations.  
Regulatory Negotiation (“reg-neg”) is a rulemaking process in which a government 
regulatory agency organizes a stakeholder group and commissions it to draft a proposed rule 
addressing a specific problem. The stakeholder group is supposed to represent all important 
affected groups, to be willing to bargain in good faith, and to seek consensus. Agencies are 
advised to use this method for problems that are not likely to be highly contentious, nor 
require participants to compromise their fundamental commitments (ACUS 1990:38). When 
the regulatory negotiation process is complete the agency subjects the proposed rule to a 
slightly streamlined version of its traditional rule making processes, but remains responsible 
for the ultimate content of the rule.  
Reg-Neg processes have been used in a large number of U.S. environmental 
rulemakings since the mid-1980s, although impressionistic evidence suggests that their 
popularity in the United States may have leveled off recently. Evaluations of the process are 
contentious. Some commentators argue that reg-neg has provided for a forum in which 
regulatory problems are effectively redefined, innovative solutions found, and new 
institutions developed (Freeman 1997). Others assert that they have not reduced regulatory 
costs, conflict, or litigation (Coglianese 1997), and have dangerously transferred regulatory 
power to private interests, a form of “capture” (Funk 1997).  
Ecosystem Management seeks to integrate the many environmental and social 
interconnections implicated in all significant environmental management decisions. Its goal 
is to correct for the shortcomings of single-purpose and single-technique environmental 
actors, both private and public. Ecosystem management attempts to do this by locating all 
significant actors and their activities in a broad scale ecological framework and addressing 
the complex ecological and social interactions among them. Often it also seeks to link 
“environmental” issues to social and economic ones such as community maintenance and 
job creation, thus partaking in the post-Rio ‘sustainable development’ framework. In doing 
so, most ecosystem management initiatives attempt to combine a comprehensive analytical 
methodology with broad stakeholder collaboration. An important driver of ecosystem 
management is the recognition that the fragmentation of jurisdiction over the natural 
environment among many governments and property holders leaves none of them in a 
position to achieve integrated management on its own. Integrated, ongoing stakeholder 
collaboration is necessary to make, assess, and revise environmental policy (Meidinger 1997).  
Ecosystem management has been a “top-down” strategy on the whole, conceived 
primarily by ecologists and centralized government agencies and NGOs. At the same time, 
                                                                                                                                                
must include: (a) specific definitions of management responsibilities in the company for environment matters; (b) 
a register summarizing the effects that the company’s operations on the environment; (c) environmental record 
keeping and reporting procedures; (d) a public environmental statement listing significant environmental issues 
and emissions; and (e) periodic audits of the company’s management system, with verification of the audits by an 
external auditor. Participating companies have the right to register with their national governments and to be 
included in a list of EMAS companies published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The companies 
are also permitted to advertise publicly their participation in the program (id). 
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governments and government agencies are often only one or two members of the broader 
group of stakeholders, although they sometimes play a controlling role. To date, the legal 
framework for ecosystem management appears to consist primarily of memoranda of 
understanding among units of government and contractual agreements among government 
agencies and landholders. Ecosystem management proponents in the United States have 
generally not sought amendments or new authority in statutes (Interagency Task Force 
1995), evidently out of a fear of “opening up” environmental statutes to the risk of 
weakening amendments.  
Place-Based Collaborative Management Initiatives are closely related to ecosystem 
management ones, but have typically been more bottom-up, self-organized processes. They 
are often established on a “watershed” basis, on the underlying theory that actors in a 
watershed are mutually dependent upon each other, and would be well advised to work out 
mutually acceptable understandings of proper environmental management. The watershed 
frame also provides a basis for deciding who the participants should be. The specific focci of 
place-based groups vary with the environmental management issues relevant to the particular 
place. They often involve water quality, fisheries, and forest management, although the scope 
of issues can expand beyond traditional environmental ones to include social and economic 
ones. The United States EPA estimates that there are currently over 3000 local watershed 
management groups in the United States (Lewicki 2001).  
Some place-based groups have evolved very definite structures of rights and 
responsibilities, enforceable through legal or informal sanctions (e.g., Pinkerton and 
Weinstein 1995) whereas others have much looser, more fluid arrangements in which 
members come and go (Nickelsberg 1998). Again, government bodies sometimes participate 
in place-based management initiatives, but more as stakeholders than as sovereigns. In recent 
years governments seem increasingly inclined to take steps to facilitate place based 
management processes, thus giving them some “top-down” impetus as well. In the US, for 
example, the EPA has encouraged states to set up watershed management groups to set and 
allocate “total maximum daily loads” of pollution for particular watersheds under the Clean 
Water Act (Houck 1999).  
Voluntary Agreements typically are “one-shot” deals negotiated between government 
agencies and firms in which the firms commit to improving their environmental 
performance beyond what is required under existing law. They differ from flexible permits in 
that there is no pre-defined framework in which they are worked out, and they are therefore 
difficult to incorporate systematically in environmental law (Murswiek 2001). Voluntary 
agreements are extremely common in Japan, and quite common in some European countries 
(Carraro and Leveque 1999). They can be negotiated at the national, regional, or local level. 
Although local governments seem particularly vulnerable to informational and negotiating 
inequalities in relation to firms, there are good arguments that voluntary agreements allow 
governments to achieve higher levels of environmental protection than they otherwise would 
(Rehbinder 1994; Carraro and Leveque 1999).  
“Good Neighbor Agreements” are somewhat like traditional voluntary agreements, but 
are negotiated between firms and community groups or other civil society organizations, 
rather than between firms and governments (Olsen 1991). It is impossible to say how many 
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exist, but they seem to be multiplying rapidly, facilitated to some extent by the public 
information, participation, and review requirements of government regulatory programs. 
Good neighbor agreements often are very sophisticated arrangements, approximating or 
exceeding the detail and coverage of permit documents prepared by regulatory agencies (e.g., 
Stillwater Mine 2000). They generally seek to achieve environmental performance superior to 
that government agencies are able to require, and largely cut government out of the deal, 
leaving it only as a background player. Contract law and private land use agreements often 
are used to help assure compliance.  
Environmental Certification Programs provide frameworks in which firms can be 
certified as practicing good environmental management. Some, such as the chemical 
industry’s “Responsible Care” program (Gunningham 1995) and the United States forest 
product industry’s Sustainable Forestry Initiative, are run by industry trade associations. 
Others, such as the ISO 14001 program, are run by inter-sectoral industry-based groups, 
some of which are government sanctioned. Still others, such as the Forest Stewardship 
Council, are established by NGO-based groups. Depending on the program, firms are 
entitled to signal their certification status by displaying labels on their literature, facilities, or 
products. ISO-type programs focus on the implementation of sophisticated environmental 
management systems (“EMS”s) by firms (Coglianese and Nash 2001), while FSC-type 
programs focus on performance requirements. The performance requirements almost always 
include traditional pollution and biodiversity concerns, but some are now extending to 
include economic, community, and labor ones as well.  
Summary. Taken together, the above-described initiatives indicate great churning in the 
field of environmental law. Most of them expand the role of civil society organizations in 
domestic environmental law. For the most part, civil society institutions do not seem to 
displace government ones, but rather enter open ended cooperative and partnership 
relationships with them (cf, Freeman 2000; Meidinger 2001a; Wood, forthcoming).16 
Government agencies generally remain dominant, but rely heavily on extra-governmental 
processes and relationships, and often operate in horizontal rather than vertical relationships 
with them. Although it is difficult to generalize about such a diverse set of initiatives, it 
seems safe to predict that they will lead to increased incorporation of civil society norms and 
institutions into governmental regulation, making it all the more important to monitor civil 
society institutions. It also seems possible that the new inititatives portend fundamentally 
more complex and contentious legal processes, as the roles and responsibilities of various 
governmental and nongovernmental actors overlap and blur. These problems seem 
especially likely if the tendency to integrate traditionally separate economic and social 
concerns expands, concomitantly expanding both the number of interested actors and the 
inherent conceptual and informational challenges. 
                                                           
16 I use the term “organization” to refer to specific organized groups of actors, whereas “institution” refers to larger 
patters of relationships into which specific organizations come and go.  
  Meidinger, Forest Certification as Environmental Law Making 309 
 
GLOBAL 
Global environmental law has a history broadly similar to its domestic counterpart, but 
much briefer and less accomplished. Before World War II there was very little international 
environmental law, the primary exceptions being treaties to protect migratory birds and a 
few international water bodies. Since World War II the pace has accelerated considerably, 
with a raft of treaties and cases seeking to protect transnational environmental resources 
(Kiss and Shelton 2000). Important examples include the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”) and the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”), as well as the soon-to-be-
ratified Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (“POPs Convention”).  
On the whole, however, progress through the Westphalian system of nation-state 
negotiations has been painfully slow, while the growth of serious transnational 
environmental problems has been remarkably rapid. Problems such as global climate change, 
biodiversity loss, ocean degradation, desertification, drinking water degradation, and 
hazardous and nuclear waste mismanagement have not been credibly addressed by the 
Westphalian system. Even where treaties exist, their enforceability and adaptability to change 
often are subject to serious doubt. Finally, the growing promotion of international trade, and 
the distrust of regulations that could conceivably constitute non-tariff trade barriers, create 
international obstacles to improved domestic environmental regulation.  
Given the limited capacity and achievements of Westphalian institutions, it is not 
surprising that global civil society organizations would attempt to fill the gap. As noted in 
thecompanion paper, it was the failure of international institutions to protect tropical forests 
that spurred the growth of forest certification in the first place. For this reason and because 
of the law-like nature and structure of forest certification, it is in the ironic position of being 
faced with the same questions confronting traditional legal systems.  
FOREST CERTIFICATION AS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
This section treats forest certification as a form of environmental law and starts to ask some 
of the questions regarding certification that are asked of environmental law. Of the many 
possible criteria that could be deployed and their variants, this paper focuses on four general 
areas: efficacy, coherence, adaptability, and legitimacy. Its goal is more to clarify and frame 
important questions than to answer them at this stage, although some working hypotheses 
are offered.  
EFFICACY 
In modern times, the criterion most frequently invoked to evaluate legal systems is that of 
efficacy (e.g., Jones 1969). Its core question is whether the legal system effectively governs 
how people interact in a given field. In the case of environmental law, the question is 
whether the legal system effectively governs human relationships to the biophysical 
environment. Ironically, there has been very little research on the overall efficacy of Phase 1 
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and Phase 2 environmental law systems. This is in part because of the enormous difficulty, if 
not impossibility, of attributing cause and effect relationships to such large phenomena.  
There is also an important and contested preliminary problem: efficacy toward what 
end? Neither the traditional environmental law system nor forest certification have come up 
with a clearly defined end. Indeed, as suggested above, part of the operation of any legal 
system focuses on defining the goals of the system. Environmental law and forest 
certification are caught up in larger societal dialogues on environmental policy. In the past 
two decades societal conceptions of environmental regulation have begun to shift from 
relatively narrow, negative conceptions of controlling pollution and other destructive 
practices toward broader, more affirmative conceptions of achieving sustainability and 
sustainable development. These affirmative conceptions include important social and 
economic goals, such as economic vitality and community stability. For this reason alone 
they are harder than negative goals to operationalize, and their achievement is accordingly 
harder to “certify.” In fact, the difficulty of documenting sustainability prompted the Forest 
Stewardship Council to redefine what its program certifies, from “sustainably” to “well” 
managed forests.  
Nonetheless, there has been considerable discussion about the efficacy of forest 
certification, mostly focusing on how well it protects the environment.17 The first level has 
debated the comparative advantages of programs based on substantive standards versus 
those based on environmental management systems (e.g., Hauselmann 1997; Krut and 
Gleckman 1998). The second level has debated the comparative effects of different 
standards-based systems (e.g., CEPI 2000, Meridian Institute 2001). Although some of this 
debate is based on limited empirical research, most of it is hypothetical-deductive in form. In 
other words, it assumes that standards will be fully implemented and then compares the 
assumed effects of the standards. Similarly, standards systems and environmental 
management systems are compared based on analysts’ assumptions about how they will 
work in practice. These assumptions often are based on a queasy mix of real-world 
experience and commitment to different management philosophies and even theories of 
social control.  
Many of the analyses that have been done are useful in that they clarify the terms and 
structures of certification programs. And despite my critical posture, it is my impression that 
forest certification programs are leading to some improvements in forest management (see 
generally Meidinger 1999:164, 199, 217). Still, we know very little about why or where or 
under what conditions. And debates regarding the relative merits of different approaches 
probably cannot be sorted out at this point because we lack anything remotely 
approximating evaluation research.  
The absence of rigorous evaluation research on forest certification is somewhat ironic, 
since the efficacy of certification systems is in principle easier to research than the efficacy of 
                                                           
17 This is not surprising, since there is broad agreement across legal systems that protection of environmental 
resources, particularly those that are valuable to humans, is a core goal of environmental law (e.g., Lundmark, 
1998:9). It does, however, fall short of addressing the post-Rio environment-society-economy goals of sustainable 
development.  
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more multi-faceted legal systems. If proper evaluation research were to be done, comparable 
firms would be randomly assigned either to be certified or not. The certification group 
would also be randomly assigned to different certification programs so that the programs 
could be compared (see generally, Campbell and Stanley 1963). The performance of the 
firms would be measured before and after certification, ideally at regular intervals. Typical 
performance of certified and non-certified firms could then be compared by program.  
Systematic evaluation research is quite unlikely to be done, however, for two basic 
reasons. First, because certification programs are self-defined as voluntary there is a 
significant problem with ‘selection effects.’ Firms choose whether or not to participate in 
certification programs based on their individual assessments of what is in their best interest. 
It is therefore likely that significant prior differences exist between firms that enter 
certification programs and those that do not, and between firms that enter different 
certification programs or enter them at different times. Accordingly, differences in their 
performance over time are as likely to be correlated with underlying differences among 
firms, as with differences in the programs per se.18  
Second, certification programs are not designed to produce detailed, comparative data 
on the performance of forest enterprises. Rather, the whole point of certification is to make 
a binary classification: certified or not-certified. Firms within the certified category are 
portrayed as if they were homogenous in performance. The primary site-specific information 
provided by certification programs is the label itself. The label can be matched up with the 
standards and criteria on which it is based, but the standards and criteria are general, and do 
not provide any further information on the particular enterprise. If such information is to be 
provided, it must come from voluntary action of the firm or compulsory mandates of other 
regulators, usually governments. This situation exposes a second level of irony: some of the 
attraction of certification to firms may derive from its potential to stave off mandatory 
regulatory disclosure of more detailed information on their operations.  
In sum, we do not have and are not likely to get anything approximating scientifically 
persuasive information on the efficacy of forest certification programs. This does not mean, 
however, that we are incapable of making efficacy assessments and recommendations. 
Research on other areas of regulation suggests several areas of concern that will have to be 
dealt with over time as certification systems assess their efficacy and seek to reconfigure 
themselves. I raise them here in an attempt to spur discussion as early as possible. Given that 
forest certification is only one forest regulatory system among several, it is useful to consider 
efficacy from both an internal and external standpoint.  
Internal 
Viewed internally, regulatory systems can be understood primarily as seeking to control the 
behavior of their direct “targets” - typically regulated firms. We have a great deal of 
experience with command and control regulation which might be useful to forest 
certification. In this section I will touch on only a few issues that seem most immediate.  
                                                           
18 This is a more general version of the argument that firms seeking certification are likely to be good performers 
regardless of whether they undertake certification. (E.g., Thornber et al¸1999:15). 
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Accountability.19 At present certification systems are built on a three part accountability 
structure: policy maker/accreditor➝certifier➝forest management organization. This is a 
rough approximation of the agency➝inspector➝regulated firm structure typical of 
governmental regulation, but there are several important differences. First, many certification 
systems seek to improve the compliance of organizations by institutionalizing controls 
within the firm in the form of environmental management systems. Many government 
agencies are also purusing such strategies, but there is little information to date on how well 
they work. As I have suggested above and elsewhere (Meidinger 1999:199-203), it is hard to 
believe that environmental management systems will have no effect on firm behavior. On 
the whole, they seem likely to lead to improvements, simply because they give specific actors 
in management organizations specific responsibilities for specific issues - whereas before 
these elements were often highly diffuse or absent in the management organizations. We just 
do not know how much improvement there is or under what circumstances. 
The second important difference is that certifiers are not employees of the certification 
programs. Rather, they are hired and paid by firms seeking to be certified. Experience with 
other regulatory programs suggests that this situation has the potential to lead to at least two 
major types of problems: limited enforcement resources and risks of corruption.  
Limited Enforcement Resources. The resources available to certifiers to monitor 
compliance come from the firms being monitored, and are fundamentally limited by the total 
magnitude of certification revenues. This means it will be difficult for certifiers to 
concentrate resources on monitoring firms in the way an administrative agency might, for 
example, focus its resources on particular companies thought likely to present special 
problems. Certifiers will generally be hard pressed to set their fees for any particular firm 
higher than the costs of certifying that firm in order to pay for surveillance of other firms. It 
may be possible for certification firms to call for help with extra resources from 
environmental NGOs or foundations in particularly difficult circumstances, but it does not 
seem likely that they will be able to do so on a regular or continuing basis.  
Risk of Corruption. Second, there is a serious risk of what as well be labeled corruption, 
despite the term’s powerful overtones. By corruption I simply mean allowing one’s official 
judgments to be influenced by self-interest in a way that is inconsistent with one’s official 
duties. Because of their need for continuing revenues, certifiers are highly dependent on 
firms seeking certification and are under pressure to satisfy them. This is particularly true of 
the ISO 14001 and AF&PA Sustainable Forestry Initiative programs, but also applies to the 
FSC program. Certifiers have strong interests in pleasing their employers, and are likely to be 
selected in part because they are expected to sympathize with the viewpoints of their 
employers.20 At the same time, of course, the reason certifiers are employed is to provide 
assurance to the public that the firms employing them in fact are performing as advertised. 
Certifiers are thus placed in an inherently difficult position, since they are in effect public 
                                                           
19 This paper focuses on internal program accountability and control. The bigger question of democratic 
accountability to the public (e.g., Spiro 1996) is left for a later paper.  
20 For a critical analysis of PriceWaterhouseCoopers auditing of clothing manufacturers, see O’Rourke 2000. For an 
argument that auditors suffer from an inherent “self-serving bias” see Prentice 2000. 
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fiduciaries employed by the very private actors whose activities they are supposed to assess 
and monitor. To date, in my estimation, the public discussion and analysis of this problem in 
the forest certification arena has been quite limited and exceedingly naïve. This is probably 
due in part to the fact that the primary basis of reliability attributed to certifiers is 
professionalism, and the discussion has taken place primarily among forestry professionals. 
We know from the history of other fiduciary professions, however, including accounting and 
law, that other safeguards are important and perhaps essential.  
Institutional Safeguards. At present there are very few structural safeguards against 
corruption in forest certification. The primary one in the case of the FSC is periodic auditing 
of certifiers’ decisions by FSC staff. Although this process recently led to the suspension of 
one certifier’s privileges,21 the oversight resources of the FSC are very limited, and are likely 
to remain so for the foreseeable future. The AF&PA system evidently provides for no 
auditing of certifiers at all, and indeed makes them even more dependent on firms than the 
FSC system. The AF&PA has provided, however, for a rudimentary external complaint 
system wherein people who believe they have information indicating that a member 
company is not conforming to SFI guidelines can submit that information to someone who 
will keep their identities confidential. This is a start toward creating a more adequate 
accountability structure, but a very limited and probably quite inadequate one, because there 
are likely to be few cases in which people have the necessary combination of information 
and interest to file complaints.  
Research on regulatory institutions has produced a broad consensus that triangulation 
of social accountability structures is important to regulatory efficacy. The key idea is to 
empower third parties to monitor the performance of both regulators and regulatees (Ayres 
and Braithwaite 1992). The third parties may be organized groups, or they may be more 
diffuse actors such as citizens. Many institutional mechanisms exist for achieving 
triangulation. Perhaps the most important in environmental regulation are “citizen suit” and 
various “transparency” and public information devices. A citizen suit mechanism empowers 
parties aggrieved by non-compliance with a rule to bring legal enforcement actions directly 
against the violator, with or without action by the government regulator (Boyer and 
Meidinger 1985). Transparency mechanisms give aggrieved parties information with which 
to publicize the misbehavior of the regulated party to the public at large and possibly to take 
or provoke legal action. The “community-right-to-know” laws discussed above are one of 
the most powerful examples in modern law, but there are others (Karkkainen 2001).  
It is important to note that triangulation mechanisms place increased compliance 
pressures not only on regulatees, but also on regulators, whose performance can also be 
assessed. This creates some structural “balance” in a situation where regulators are 
responsible for protecting public interests, and is likely to improve the efficacy of the 
regulators in performing their functions. Another important factor is that the outsiders must 
                                                           
21 The certification organization involved was SKAL, based in the Netherlands, which was temporarily deprived of 
its authority to issue new certificates. (FSC headquarters circular to National Initiatives, April 9, 2001) (on file 
with author). It was reinstated about a month later, after undergoing intensive discussions and a training session. 
(Memo from Karen Tam, Operations Officer to FSC Members, May 11, 2001.) (on file with author). 
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have some leverage to challenge the effectiveness of the system in order to enhance its 
effectiveness. Typically, this means the capacity to inflict some kind of “bad” on poorly 
performing parties. Third, of course, this process is likely to make forest certification more 
of a public phenomenon, and less a narrowly “professional” one. 
Many different triangulation structures are possible for forest certification, and it is not 
feasible to propose or justify a specific one here. Rather, the key point is that to achieve 
reliable efficacy (and thereby adaptability and legitimacy) forest certification programs will 
likely need to empower third parties to monitor and challenge the performance of firms and 
programs.22 The third parties should be involved not only in the policy formation process, 
but also in the implementation process. Who they should be could vary among from one 
cultural and institutional context to another, but it seems clear that the issue will need to be 
worked out for certification to become a dependably effective process. 
“Creative Compliance.” Another dimension of forest certification that has received much 
thought by lawyers and some study by socio-legal scholars, but relatively little public 
discussion by forest certification experts is the problem of “creative compliance.” If pressed, 
many lawyers would probably acknowledge that one of their most important roles is to help 
clients “work around” rules. Working around rules does not mean violating them, but rather 
finding ways to conform to them while sometimes attaining ends that the rules were 
probably intended to prevent. McBarnet and Whelan (1997, 1999) provide a number of 
informative case studies of how corporate lawyers have figured out ways to get around 
financial regulations, often with the tacit cooperation of accountants who enjoy 
institutionalized trust very similar to that accorded forest certifiers.23  
Creative compliance seems to be an endemic tendency of rule-based systems, and there 
is no reason to think that forest certification systems will be free of the problem. I suspect 
that the main reason it has not received much thought to date is that the designers of 
                                                           
22 In principle, it is possible that governmental agencies could play the triangulation role in some contexts. It seems 
unlikely, however, that those contexts will be ones where agencies are already heavily involved in certification, 
such as in Europe, since their interests are rather closely aligned with some certification programs (e.g., the 
PEFC) and opposed to others (e.g., the FSC).  
23 The collapse of the energy trading corporation, Enron, in late 2001, evidently due in part to creative compliance 
with accounting rules approved by major accounting firm Arthur Anderson, might be taken as an exclamation 
point to this warning, which was written months before the collapse. However, the exact bearing of the Enron 
case on forest certification remains to be worked out. One of the commonly cited problems, the provision of 
both accounting and consulting services by Arthur Anderson, with the consulting as lucrative as the accounting 
work, may have given Anderson an added incentive to facilitate creative compliance. No evidence has come to 
my attention that there is a comparable problem in the forest certification context, although it is difficult to say 
with certainty. Most certification programs appear to have bans on certifiers providing consultancy services to 
firms they certify, but it is not out of the question that some of the experts retained by certification firms may 
have interests of some kind in the professional advice relied upon by certified forest enterprises. On the other 
hand, there is a type of accountability pressure present in the financial accounting world that is absent from or 
much weaker in the forest certification world, and that is the fact that stockholders who might be injured by 
accountant ratified overestimates of a stock’s value will place considerable pressures on accountants to avoid such 
situations (Morgenson 2002). If an accounting firm got a reputation for approving questionable practices, its 
audits would lose value in the financial markets and its business would therefore be expected to decline. There are 
not likely to be comparable pressures from consumers of certified wood, although competitors might have 
incentives to police one another to some extent. 
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certification systems are strongly inclined either to believe their rules will work, or at least 
not to question them too closely. Moreover, they may be somewhat naïve about the 
workings of traditional governmental regulatory programs. Eventually they will have to 
confront the problem, however. They will have to engage in the same kind of process that 
financial regulators are involved in, which is trying to adjust their rules to close off the loop 
holes that creative compliers have found and then watching for reports of new forms of 
creative compliance. At present, however, as is further discussed in the “adaptation” section 
below, forest certification systems seem poorly equipped to deal with this challenge. They 
are not organized to systematically collect information on creative compliance. No one in the 
system has that function.  
External 
The fact that certification programs operate in a larger regulatory arena, often competing and 
cooperating with one another and with governments, means that they can also achieve 
efficacy by influencing other programs. First, and most obviously, there is reason to believe 
that more rigorous certification programs, such as the FSC, have spurred significant 
improvements in less rigorous ones, such as the SFI (Meidinger 1999); a moderately 
optimistic analysis holds that this dynamic is likely to occur to certification programs 
generally (Fung, et al. 2001). Less obviously, certification programs may also have broader 
external effects by stimulating improvements in governmental environmental regulation and 
promoting increased consistency among jurisdictions.  
Improved Governmental Regulation. Forest certification programs have the attention of 
governmental forestry agencies in most of the world. Some government management 
agencies have chosen to seek certification of the lands they manage under one program or 
another. Others, particularly in Europe and Asia, have formed alliances with specific 
certification programs. Even where governments are officially detached they are likely to be 
influenced in various ways by certification programs. First, as noted above, certification 
programs are likely to bring public attention to how well government agencies are doing 
their work, and may possibly spur them to improve. Second, the larger discussion of forestry 
standards and practices stimulated by certification processes is likely to infuse governmental 
legal requirements in various ways, including changes in formal rules and informal 
implementation practices, as well as standards imposed by courts and other agencies (see 
generally Meidinger 2001a). In Bolivia the FSC-oriented standard setting process undertaken 
by a non-profit civil society organization led not only to the creation FSC national standards, 
but also to revisions of government requirements, which ended up being effectively the 
same. The government regulations also recognize FSC certified forestry operations as 
complying with forest laws (Cordero 2001).  
Third, government agencies could simply require certification as a condition of 
conducting forestry in their jurisdictions, as some have done already (Meidinger 2001a), thus 
significantly expanding their total implementation capacity. There are intermediate options as 
well. For example, when Guatemala makes a land concession to a community forestry group 
in the Biosphere Reserve it requires the group to obtain FSC certification within three years 
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(Finger-Stich 2001), apparently as a condition of retaining the concession. Even if they do 
not formally require certification, government agencies could concentrate their enforcement 
on uncertified firms, treating certified ones as likely to be in compliance. Again, this would 
effectively expand total enforcement resources and presumably lead to improved overall 
compliance.24 Governments could even seek to leverage their overall resources by attempting 
to ‘steer’ certification programs, as they are doing to a limited degree already (Webb 1999). 
This strategy might be one of the ways in which states gradually redefine their regulatory 
roles, increasingly incorporating civil society regulatory programs where they can, and 
focusing their own efforts on areas where certification programs are less helpful. It should 
be noted, however, that any obvious increased government involvement in or reliance on 
certification programs is likely to trigger back-pressure by industry on certification programs. 
Thus, there might be increased pressure for lower standards and less expensive, weaker 
inspection practices, as evidently has been the case with the PEFC.  
Interjurisdictional Consistency. As a global movement, forest certification automatically 
creates new channels of communication and comparison across national boundaries. If in 
fact it has the influence on governmental regulatory standards and practices posited above, 
certification has the potential to promote increased regulatory consistency and convergence 
among jurisdictions, both governmental and non-governmental. Although this possibility is 
subject to the logical challenges of coherence discussed below, it is a goal high on the agenda 
of both environmental organizations and many transnational businesses, who see advantages 
to consistent rules across jurisdictions. At present, there remains enormous variability among 
national systems and different certification systems, but the possibility exists that together 
they will serve as conduits for convergence over time. 
ADAPTABILITY 
Ultimately, forest certification will be efficacious only to the extent that it promotes 
sustainable forest management. Promoting sustainability will not be a simple matter of 
implementing existing rules and standards. First, there is inevitably much we do not know 
about how to achieve sustainability. Second, those subject to tcertification programs will 
often practice “creative compliance”. And third, rule systems generally have unanticipated 
consequences as great or greater than the intended ones (Jones 1969). Therefore, they need 
to be adaptable.  
In essence the challenge of adaptability is a challenge of learning - learning to solve 
emergent problems (Lee 1993). Forest certification programs face major challenges regarding 
how to institutionalize learning. Perhaps because they have conceptualized themselves so 
much as rule systems, and because there has been so much contention about the content of 
                                                           
24 Interestingly, the degree to which this has occurred to date is unclear. The U.S.E.P.A. evidently has increased the 
resources it expends on defining and managing the “Performance Track” program, for example, but there is little 
evidence that it has shifted enforcement resources to monitoring firms that are not in the program (Coglianese 
and Nash 2001:231-232) 
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the rules, they do not seem to have taken seriously the problem of gathering and analyzing 
information about their own performance and how they can improve it.  
The primary need is to create feedback loops from ground-level experience to system-
level policies. The major repositories of ground level information, certifiers, do not seem to 
have incentives or resources to share information on implementation experiences or to 
gather systematic information. Indeed, since they compete with each other, certifiers may 
have disincentives to share anything beyond the trivial or obvious. Management 
organizations are also in competition with each other, and would seem to have equally few 
incentives to share information, particularly when it might cost them money. As forest 
certification is presently constituted, no other interests have the capacity to gather detailed 
information on ground level experience.  
This situation could change if some of the suggestions for transparency and 
triangulation made above were to be adopted. It probably must change if forest certification 
is to become sufficiently adaptive to remain viable over the long term. The fact that the 
problem has not been more carefully addressed to date seems particularly unfortunate given 
the potential envisioned by some observers for transnational NGOs to become agents of 
global social learning (e.g. Finger 1994:65). If this potential is realized, it is likely to be a 
major development in the capacity of global civil society to circumvent some of the severe 
limitations of the Westphalian governance system.  
COHERENCE 
From the perspective of legal theory, forest certification, particularly as exemplified by the 
FSC, is a stunningly ambitious undertaking. It seeks to create a set of rules and institutions 
for forest certification that (1) integrate environmental, social, and economic goals and (2) 
apply them consistently across boreal, temperate and tropical forests (3) in developed and 
developing regions with vastly different institutional arrangements and cultural traditions. 
One may pause simply to wonder whether any rational actor would undertake such a 
profoundly difficult task. Of course a skeptic might quickly observe that perhaps the 
ambitions of forest certification are not as great as they seem. Actually, what forest 
certification needs to achieve is an acceptable image of globally consistent rules rather than 
the “reality” (Balkin 1993). This is also what most global traders would want - a system in 
which the fundamental qualities of products are not subject to question.  
Regardless of whether the ambitions of forest certification are truly staggering, or 
merely unprecedented, they are worth following closely. The Westphalian system has been 
utterly incapable of fulfilling either vision. All legal systems should therefore pay close 
attention to how forest certification fares. If forest certification makes significant progress 
there is much to be learned from it, both about how to make rules and about the emergent 
role of global civil society. In this section my goal is primarily to clarify some of the 
challenges of coherence posed by such a grand set of goals, and secondarily to offer a few 
observations about what is being done to meet them.  
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Integration  
As noted above, the core goal of integration involves incorporating environmental, social, 
and economic goals in the same set of standards. This general approach is supported by the 
increasingly commonplace view, promoted for about two decades now, that one cannot have 
a healthy environment without a healthy economy and society, and vice versa. Of course, 
these concerns have largely been kept separate in traditional legal and regulatory systems. 
The FSC forest certification program thus attempts to break new ground. Initially, it seeks to 
do so by addressing the various concerns in individual principles. In practice, however, the 
principles must be accommodated with each other not only in regional standard setting 
processes, but also, and probably more importantly, in the course of each certification 
decision. How much responsibility for protecting the environment, for example, can firms 
be required to carry when they are also enjoined to remain economically viable in a market 
where not all firms are certified? Similarly, what provisions are sufficient to protect 
indigenous rights, given that clear adjudications could take a long time in many places, and 
possibly negate the economic viability of certain enterprises?  
These questions have been handled largely in individual certification processes to date, 
occasionally with considerable public conflict, but mostly below the radar screen. The ideal 
of the FSC (and derivatively of the PEFC), however, has been that regionally-based 
stakeholder standard-setting processes will provide contextually appropriate answers, 
reflecting regional culture and values. Making the tradeoffs in this way implies a culturally 
based coherence supported by the reasoning developed in decision process. This is fairly 
similar to traditional democratic justifications for law as well as to Habermas’ dialogic model 
(1989), but it faces several problems. First, of course, it is possible that the tradeoffs would 
have been quite different if different people had participated in the standard setting process, 
as has been asserted for example in the FSC Canadian Maritime standard setting case. There 
the timber industry claimed that the standards were inappropriate because they were 
developed without sufficient industry input, and was partially sustained by an investigating 
commission (FSC Commission of Enquiry 2000). While this can be described as a problem 
of stakeholder theory, it also affects the ideal of coherence, since it may be that regional 
values simply do not and are not likely to fit together in many situations. Legal theorist 
Joseph Raz suggests that this is a problem with all efforts to privilege conceptual coherence 
in law (1992:310). 
This problem becomes much more serious when the global scope of the system is 
considered. The promise of forest certification is that a piece of certified wood from 
Malaysia is the environmental and social equivalent of a piece of certified wood from 
Sweden. For this to be the case one of two conditions must be met. Either “equivalent” 
must mean merely that a regional standard has been set in each case and that each piece of 
wood meets the applicable regional standard (avoiding for the moment the problem of 
setting a standard for what constitutes a legitimate standard setting process). Or, there must 
be some logical relationship between the standards making them comparable within a larger 
framework. Most forest certification programs are strongly committed to the second 
principle, although they vacillate on how to meet it. The environmental NGO FERN, for 
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example, argues that one reason performance based systems are necessary for certification is 
that only they can achieve coherence. Environmental management system standards, by 
contrast are fundamentally incapable of achieving coherence (FERN 2001:17). 
The commitment of forest certification programs to coherence reflects an underlying 
assumption that there is globally common standard for proper forest management, and that 
it is possible for forest certification programs to certify it. The assumption of a common 
moral standard seems to apply equally to the global civil society movement. Thus forest 
certification in particular and global civil society in general are faced with the need to create 
coherence in order to advance their causes. I will not predict whether or how they will do it - 
only that they will and must try. One route is for certification programs to promote master 
metaphors, such as “ecosystem health” and “sustainable forestry” (e.g., Shannon, Meidinger 
and Clark 1996) and position themselves to be the ones who progressively fill those 
metaphors with concrete meaning. It will be interesting to compare the process with 
developments in international commercial arbitration (Dezalay and Garth 1996) and 
computer operating systems (Lessig 1999), where competitive informal definitional processes 
seem to have been key, with forest certification, which seems to lean toward more formal 
arrangements.  
It will also be interesting to observe to what extent variations in specific standards can 
be reconciled with the requirement of coherence. Can the FSC, for example, effectively 
persuade people that requiring elaborate protective equipment for adult workers in Swedish 
certified forests is equivalent to allowing barefoot twelve-year-olds to work in third world 
certified forests, where if they do not do so their families they may starve? How will this be 
done? The current debate within the forest certification world will eventually have to find a 
social reception outside it. In doing so it may have to develop a persuasive account of how 
facially different regional standards should be seen as effectively consistent.  
Federalism 
The FSC is organized to address the problem of regional challenges to coherence primarily 
with a system of closely coordinated federalism. The primary processes involved are central 
review of regionally developed standards for conformance with the international principles 
and criteria, and inter-regional “harmonization” processes. A number of examples of each 
are now complete, and will undoubtedly be subjected to intensive review. From a legal 
scholarship standpoint, the harmonization processes are fascinating. While there are some 
guidelines for how they are to be carried out, they seem to vary greatly from one region to 
the next. This is not to say that they will not work well, only that a theory of why they work 
well will have to be developed after the fact.25  
                                                           
25 To date, the PEFC has devoted considerably less resources than the FSC to the problem of inter-regional 
harmonization, and indeed seems to start from the assumption that all European standards are fundamentally 
comparable. As Rehbinder (2002) points out, the FSC is not free of the problem, in that many of the regional 
standard setting bodies are organized according to national boundaries, thus suggesting a potential 
“renationalization” of standards. Nor is his critique vitiated by the fact that the larger nations include multiple 
regional standard setting bodies. 
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Moreover, if one compares these harmonization processes to traditional Westphalian 
ones, they could come out looking fairly good. It is quite possible that NGOs and 
certification programs link levels and regions much more successfully than governments. 
They also benefit from a narrower set of concerns. The Maritime region’s view of the Great 
Lakes region’s herbicide policy, for example, is not dependent on the Great Lakes region’s 
position on software sales to the Maritime region. Global Civil Society programs also benefit 
from rapid communications technologies, less cumbersome decision procedures, and 
(perhaps) less turf wars. Moreover, it is not inherently obvious that they are less 
“democratic” than Westphalian decision systems (Finger 1994:58), given the all of the well 
known shortcomings of governmental decision making. All in all, then, if coherence can be 
achieved, there is some reason to think that civil society organizations are in a plausible 
position to do so.  
The main shortcomings of global civil society regulatory programs are their incapacity 
to raise taxes and conduct wars - not minor defects, but perhaps not as important as they 
were in the rise of state regulatory institutions. Though poorly funded and under staffed, 
these small programs made up of relatively well informed participants who communicate 
regularly may have better prospects of achieving closure in the harmonization process than 
so non-expert legislatures with much broader issue portfolios. Finally, it is worth noting that 
the nitty-gritty details in the harmonization and central review processes are being worked 
out for the most part by foresters and environmentalists, rather than lawyers. While they are 
not trained for the job, neither are most lawyers, and it will interesting in any case to learn 
from their experience.  
(In)Determinacy 
Indeterminacy refers to a condition in which rules, even quite elaborate ones, fail to generate 
determinate outcomes in particular cases. Thus, one can take a given factual situation, apply 
the rules to it, and reach more than one logically justified conclusion. In the certification 
situation, this would mean that the same forest enterprise could be seen as either certifiable 
or not certifiable depending on how the rules are applied. Some, but not all, legal scholars 
see indeterminacy as a flaw in coherence and an inherent limitation of all rule-based systems. 
One common maxim is that the more factors a legal agent is allowed or required to consider, 
the less determinate her decision will be. In practice the situation is probably more 
complicated, depending on the nature and magnitude of the factors at issue. But it is worth 
bearing in mind in the certification context. 
I mention the issue for two reasons. First, anecdotal experience suggests that despite 
the elaborate systems of rules that have been developed in many regions (perhaps 
particularly in the U.S.), certifiers still seem to feel they must exercise a great deal of 
“professional judgment” going beyond the rules in making individual certification 
determinations. Second, these conditions seem to apply even in much more rule intensive 
(or “juridified”) arenas such as administrative regulation. Hence, the tendency of certification 
programs to promulgate growing numbers of rules, criteria, and indicators is not likely to 
resolve the problem of indeterminacy. Accordingly, the programs should probably consider 
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whether they would be better off simply publicizing and attempting to explain the role of 
professional judgment in their operations. 
LEGITIMACY 
No legal system can endure for long, or be broadly effective, relying solely on coercion. 
Rather, it must enjoy voluntary compliance by the great majority of persons subject to it. In 
attempting to understand why and when legal systems are successful, much sociolegal 
research has focused on how they build social authority so as to elicit voluntary compliance. 
Given that certification systems have very little coercive capacity, this research is particularly 
relevant to them. Perhaps the most widely relied upon concept in explaining legal authority 
has been that of legitimacy. Max Weber argued that a legal system has legitimacy when it can, 
without using coercion, elicit compliance with its rules or decisions even from people who 
disagree with the substance of those rules or decisions (1978:31). This is the “pull toward 
compliance” referred to above.26 The degree of legitimacy enjoyed by forest certification 
today is unclear, and in fact is deeply contested (Cashore, et al. 2001). Some observers, 
echoing my long-ago conversation with Professors Lyons and Mohawk, think it inevitable 
and only a matter of time until the obvious rightness of certification wins the day. Others 
view certification as a fundamentally coercive phenomenon. One industry representative told 
me bluntly that “proper forest management is what the FSC says it is . . . nothing more, 
nothing less”. His point was that the reason his company would maintain FSC certification 
was simple economic self-preservation. It could not afford to get a bad name in its markets, 
and the FSC and its allies were capable of giving it a bad name. Other company 
representatives have of course said the opposite, and talked about the basic correctness of 
the FSC or other certification standards.  
For now, it appears that the legitimacy of forest certification programs is largely 
derivative, and reflects the credibility of the groups affiliated with them. Thus the FSC 
program relies primarily on the public legitimacy of environmental (and to a lesser extent 
labor and human rights) NGOs, while other programs rely more on the somewhat uncertain 
legitimacy of the forestry profession, industry, and state agencies. Over time, however, the 
dynamics of legitimacy are likely to become more general, and certification systems will have 
to develop their own legitimacy. Whether that is happening and how is currently an open 
question subject to ongoing research (Cashore et al. 2002). By their nature, however, 
certification systems face two especially intriguing problems of legitimacy, with which I close 
this paper.  
The first problem has to do with certification programs’ reliance on market 
relationships and consumer preferences to organize governance institutions. This strategy 
                                                           
26 Whether and when legal systems actually function in this way is a difficult question about which I make no 
assumptions here. As Alan Hyde (1983) has pointed out, it may be a mistake to assume that legal systems 
generally enjoy legitimacy. It is quite possible that behavior described as being based on legitimacy is actually 
based on self-interest or other functional considerations. On the other hand, as Franck’s (1990) scholarship 
makes clear, it is difficult to understand many developments in international law without the concept of 
legitimacy.  
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may give up one of the traditional legitimacy advantages enjoyed by civil society 
organizations, which Ann Phillips describes as having a much greater capacity to “capture 
people’s hearts and minds” (1999:58) than do governments. Assuming that her assessment is 
accurate, it is worth pondering the implications of the use of marketing techniques to 
organize civil society relationships. Might this strategy inherently reduce the depth and 
durability of commitment to civil society norms? Might it reframe the background in which 
civil society actors are seen so that their views have the same ontological status as all other 
individual consumer tastes? If so, the use of market methods could create considerably 
greater difficulties than are currently apparent for holding certification institutions in place 
over the middle and long term.  
The second legitimacy challenge has to do with the global reach of forest certification 
programs. To date, the primary focus of certification systems has been on retailers and 
consumers in wealthy countries. In a global civil society, however, they will have to 
legitimate themselves simultaneously with poor, third world woods workers and villagers and 
with relatively well off northern workers. This is a major challenge - one that no 
governmental or intergovernmental body has come close to meeting. If certification 
programs in fact achieve anything approximating north-south, inter-class, inter-cultural 
legitimacy, they will have pulled off an organizational feat unprecedented in human law and 
governance. Ultimately, however, even if they are successful in establishing global legitimacy, 
we will not know for some time whether they thereby function to challenge and supplant 
governmental legal systems, or in fact to extend and amplify them.  
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